Skeptical Theism and Skeptical Atheism by Schellenberg, J. L.
To appear in Justin McBrayer and Trent Dougherty, eds., Skeptical Theism: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 
 
 
Skeptical Theism and Skeptical Atheism  
At the heart of skeptical theism are claims such as these three, defended by Michael Bergmann 
(2009): 
 
S1 We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are 
representative, relative to the property of figuring in a (potentially) God-justifying 
reason for permitting such things as hiddenness or horrors, of the possible goods 
there are.
i
 
S2 We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are 
representative, relative to the property of figuring in a (potentially) God-justifying 
reason for permitting such things as hiddenness or horrors, of the possible evils 
there are. 
S3 We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of 
between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative, 
relative to the property of figuring in a (potentially) God-justifying reason for 
permitting such things as hiddenness or horrors, of the entailment relations there 
are between possible goods and the permission of possible evils.
ii
 
 
Bergmann and other skeptical theists find claims like these to be very plausible – even 
commonsensical. They think, moreover, that the atheist who is promoting one or another 
argument from hiddenness or horrors should see them in the same way, and thereby be led to 
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give up his argument. The central idea of skeptical theism is regarded as non-discriminatory, no 
respecter of persons, available to just any reasoning person at all.   
Skeptical theism is thought by its advocates to be non-discriminatory in another way, too. 
As already suggested, it is supposed to work for just any argument from hiddenness or horrors. In 
a recent piece, Bergmann applies his skeptical theses to arguments from William Rowe, Paul 
Draper, and myself, arguing in each case that, given such truths as S1-S3, we are simply “in the 
dark” about something we need to know if the argument is to be successful (2009).  
It seems to me that skeptical theism had better have this reach if it wants to do important 
work for theism in philosophy, for a theistic device that deactivates some threatening arguments 
from hiddenness or horrors but not all of them will leave atheism untroubled (the atheist, after 
all, only needs one argument to work). But I believe that it lacks this reach. Some robust forms of 
atheistic reasoning from hiddenness or horrors are untouched by it, at least to this extent: that 
they are not prevented by it from providing justification for the atheist to be an atheist.
iii
 This is 
argued in section I. In section II we see that skeptical theism is non-discriminatory in a way that 
might not be welcomed by its advocates, in that it suggests a new way for the atheist to question 
the theist’s support for his own belief. If skeptical theism undermines some ways of justifying 
atheistic belief, skeptical atheism undermines perhaps the most important way of trying to justify 
theistic belief, using the theist’s own form of reasoning to do so, while leaving the 
aforementioned atheistic arguments unscathed. Finally, in section III I expose another way in 
which we might speak of a ‘skeptical atheism’ alongside skeptical theism, growing out of the 
discussion of the previous section. Paradoxical as it may seem, an investigative atheism may be 
embedded in a wider skepticism, and may use the form of reasoning employed by skeptical 
theists to realize new ways of perpetuating at least doubt about theism and, more positively, to 
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communicate an urgent message: that a very great deal of investigation remains to be done into 
alternatives to theism as an understanding of the Divine. The upshot? Skeptical theism utilizes a 
form of reasoning that not only lacks the reach that would make it really powerful in the hands of 
theistic philosophers, but potentially possesses quite formidable investigative powers when 
placed in the hands of atheists.   
 
I.  
Let’s begin by considering how atheistic reasoning may acquire immunity to skeptical theism. I 
suggest that the atheist should allow that skepticism is indeed often appropriate, but follow up 
with the observation that belief and confidence are sometimes appropriate, too, and that some of 
the propositions available to an atheist concerned with hiddenness or horrors (a) are ones about 
which she is appropriately believing and confident and (b) clearly entail that no God-justifying 
reason of the needed sort exists.  
Notice that we can illustrate the first part of this answer with what the skeptical theist 
himself is confident and believing about, despite his skepticism: propositions about how he 
should live his life, for example, or about not being a brain in a vat (Bergmann 2009). And 
presumably he is – at least in the present dialectical situation – not inclined to question the idea 
that the atheist is likewise rightly confident about various such things.  
Well, in the same way, I would suggest, it begs to be noted that although certainly not 
equipped with a comprehensive grasp of the domains of value and modality, and quite in the dark 
about many things, we may nonetheless be the recipients of various specific insights about value 
and modality that generate premises and inferences which an atheist can employ. As inquirers, 
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desiring to achieve fundamental understanding, whether that be theistic in nature or not, we 
should look for such stray instances where light pierces the darkness. Certainly we should not 
delight in darkness! And I would suggest that if we seek, we will find.  
There is some a priori reason to suspect that such will turn out to be the case in the 
present area of concern. This is because the claim of traditional theism is that the ultimate reality 
is a person, very different from us in various ways, certainly, but in many ways similar too. I 
don’t think this is always remembered by skeptical theists, who sometimes write as though we 
were talking about the more general idea I have elsewhere called ultimism, instead of about 
theism; as though we were forced to operate without much of an idea as to how metaphysical, 
axiological, and soteriological ultimacy are instantiated if there is a God. Given the quite detailed 
filling out of ultimism that theism represents, we do have a few ideas about such things that 
should be regarded as reliable. Theism describes the Ultimate in familiar terms, and so even if 
there may be much that we are quite unfamiliar with in the realms of value and modality, and 
even if a God would be familiar with many such things while we are not, what we do know on 
relevant matters may strongly seem to us to entail that things would in some way be different, in 
respect of hiddenness and horrors, than in fact they are, if there were a God. 
I have defended such claims in various places. Because of our access to truths about, 
among other things, the love of persons, we can learn that a perfectly loving personal God would 
never permit nonresistant nonbelief, which manifestly exists. And because of our access to truths 
about, among other things, the empathy of persons, we can learn that a perfectly empathetic 
personal God would never permit horrors, which also manifestly exist. I will not repeat all the 
details of the arguments, but they include reference to such obvious-seeming propositions as 
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Because God is unsurpassable greatness personified, persons who grow ever deeper into God 
realize their deepest good and Because God is infinitely deep and rich and exclusively good, 
endless opportunities for persons to grow ever deeper into God arise even where God has 
prevented horrors altogether and also If finite persons can achieve their deepest good without 
horrors being permitted, then an unsurpassably empathetic God will not permit horrors.  
Now in response to such claims the skeptical theist may want to suggest that some 
unknown valuable dimension of growth into God might, for all we know, require that horrors be 
permitted. But this may seem to the atheist a case of implausible reaching, which reason alone 
can no longer be said to support (see Schellenberg 2007, pp. 254-256). Or perhaps the skeptical 
theist will want to argue for the possibility of relevant goods external to any such relationship 
which God might find attractive. But here again it may seem to the atheist that we have to forget 
what theism has got us talking about in the first place – an ultimate person – to be impressed. 
Consider by way of analogy a single man who marries and has children: Does this 
behaviour not rightly constrain the goods he is willing to pursue, at least insofar as he is a loving 
husband and father? Though when he was on his own he spent time with many female friends 
and was otherwise preoccupied with his own wide-ranging pursuits, traveling to Europe for 
months at a time, shifting from place to place and from one activity to another, now things are 
different, and quite naturally and rightly so. Now he has a family to help provide for, to support 
in emotional and financial ways. He can’t just leave for Greece or Spain any time he wants to 
indulge his own interests – better, he has new interests which lead him happily to say no when 
invitations to do such things arise. Similarly with God, if God is to be regarded as a loving 
person – an ultimately loving person – who has created vulnerable finite persons to be the object 
of Divine love. The God described by skeptical theists who may, for all we know, have purposes 
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quite unrelated to us that require hiddenness from us or horrors for us is not an ultimately loving 
and kind and empathetic being. If a person at all, such a God would be comparable to a 
delinquent father or mother who simply can’t or won’t live up to the demands taken on board 
when the commitments of marriage and family are entered into.    
The atheist, in my view, should say that there is a large medley of such things to be said 
in which may be found propositions concerning horrors or hiddenness entailing the nonexistence 
of a personal God – propositions and entailments that seem as obvious to him, that are as much a 
matter of common sense, perhaps (if we can think of the latter as extending to necessary truths), 
the longer and the more intently he reflects on them, as the claim that we may be in the dark on 
many things regarding modality and value. There is therefore absolutely nothing immodest or 
unduly cognizant of our cognitive limitations in his endorsing those views. Indeed, by accepting 
both those views and the most general and plausible content of the skeptical theist’s cautions, the 
atheist can claim to come out further ahead, in the world of inquiry, with a more balanced stance 
and one more sensitive to the results of wide reflection than would otherwise be possible.
iv
 
In his (2009) Bergmann says that he doesn’t see how love or infinite resourcefulness, 
which I have also emphasised, are relevant to whether there is an outweighing good that might 
successfully draw God’s attention, given that there being such a good would not be a contingent 
but a necessary state of affairs. In my view the strongest atheistic arguments make such an 
observation irrelevant when, against the backdrop of undeniable claims about God’s love and 
empathy, they distinguish outweighing goods from our deepest good in relationship with God, or 
when, in connection with the infinite richness and resourcefulness of God, they distinguish the 
goods emphasised by critics from the broader types of good they instantiate, all of which can be 
met with in relationship with God. But however that may be, in the present context the demurral 
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of skeptical theists is compatible with the failure of their argument. For what Bergmann and 
others don’t see needn’t prevent the atheist from being convinced, and justifiedly so, if he thinks 
he clearly sees that God would not permit horrors or hiddenness, in the context of both the 
skeptical theist’s arguments and such reflections as were outlined earlier in this section. These 
reflections, it is worth noting, take us far beyond the famous ‘noseeum’ inferences of William 
Rowe’s original arguments, to which skeptical theism was originally directed (see Rowe 1979). 
Suppose the skeptical theist grants, for reasons of the sort I have given, that his reasoning 
may not remove the atheist’s justification for believing that atheism is true. This is at the same 
time an admission that skeptical theism lacks, as I have put it, the reach that would make it really 
powerful as a theistic form of reasoning in philosophy. For it cannot entirely stamp out the blaze 
of atheistic reasoning. Skeptical theism, I suggest, is going to seem most powerful where one or 
other of three conditions is realized: (a) where the atheistic reasoning examined is exclusively 
probabilistic, perhaps depending on simple inductive inferences about reasons for evil 
unsupplemented by additional truths about the Divine nature, of the sort once found in Rowe; (b) 
where parties to the debate share an undernourished conception of God, without sufficient 
content to entail such a thing as that a God would have an aversion of the relevant sort to horrors 
or hiddenness; or (c) where the conception of God that dominates is nourished by ideas from 
theistic religious traditions reflecting centuries of thinking about God on the assumption that God 
exists, and therefore on the assumption that a God would permit both horrors and hiddenness. 
Philosophers of religion who examine atheistic reasoning should resist all three of these 
conditions, at least within the precincts of philosophy. What we have seen, in effect, is that if 
they do, they will find the philosophical force of skeptical theism against such reasoning greatly 
attenuated.         
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II.  
Suppose that the claim defended in the previous section is correct. This is compatible with the 
theist for one reason or another being justified in rejecting for herself the arguments from horrors 
or hiddenness that, I have said, may justify the atheist’s belief. Let’s suppose that she is so 
justified. Still, there is a problem for the theist’s belief that arises in this connection. For if there 
is a skeptical theism that undermines certain ways of justifying atheistic belief for the atheist, 
such as Rowe’s original evidential argument from evil, there is also a skeptical atheism that can 
undermine the theist’s ways of justifying theistic belief for herself. This, then, is the second point 
to be made in an assessment of the force of skeptical theism. Skeptical theism succeeds, to the 
extent that it does, only by empowering skeptical atheism, giving to the atheist an argument form 
she can use against the theist’s own basis or grounds for being a theist. 
I want to focus here on experiences apparently of God. In his (2009) Bergmann concedes 
that design arguments for theism are imperilled by skeptical theism. Perhaps other theistic 
arguments will be similarly affected. I will leave this for others to consider. For all such results in 
relation to theistic arguments only give skeptical theists an extra reason to do what perhaps most 
theists in philosophy are already doing: emphasise non-propositional sources of justification for 
belief. What I have in mind, in particular, are the sorts of justification for theistic belief defended 
by William P. Alston in his influential (1991) and by Alvin Plantinga in his equally influential 
(2000). Experiential accounts of theistic belief and its justification of the sort defended here have 
become more and more common in theistic philosophy in recent decades.  
So how can we bring skeptical theism into conversation with them? One way would be to 
propose a new skeptical thesis, which the atheist may say should be as acceptable to the theist as 
she claims S1-S3 ought to be to Rowe: 
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S4 We have no good reason for thinking that the considerations opposing the 
epistemic force of religious experience we know of are representative, relative to 
the property of (potentially) figuring in an undefeatable defeater of religious 
experience as justification for theistic belief, of the considerations opposing the 
epistemic force of religious experience there are. 
 
There is, I suggest, no non-arbitrary way for the theist to discriminate between the matters 
addressed by S1-S3 and those addressed by S4 in relation to what she has reason to believe. If we 
are cognitively limited in a way that would make the first three propositions true, then the fourth 
is true as well: the cognitive limitations in question affect all the matters under considerations 
here if they affect any. Notice also, in this connection, that S4 is as ‘theism-friendly’ as 
Begmann’s own theses, mentioned earlier, are ‘atheism-friendly.’
v
 Good reason to believe in God 
is no more good reason to affirm representativeness here than good reason to believe in the 
nonexistence of God was good reason to affirm it there.  
Let’s look a bit more closely now at how Rowe can return the favour when the skeptical 
theist hands him her argument, thus becoming, in effect, a skeptical atheist. The bearing of facts 
about value and modality, which the skeptical theist already regards as rightfully generating 
skepticism, may be harder to see in this case. But it is there. It might be, for example (so the 
skeptical theist should reflect to herself), that what certain unknown truths would clearly show to 
anyone who beheld them is that great evils would necessarily be generated were God to be 
present to traditional theists in the ways they believe to be the case, at least at the present stage of 
human development – evils sufficiently impressive to prevent any God there may be from being 
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present in those ways at this time.  
On the basis of very similar reasoning, skeptical theists make their own case against 
atheistic arguments. Indeed, the skeptical theist may think it’s enough just to say that a God’s 
reasons would not be transparent to us. For example, in his response to Divine hiddenness 
Bergmann writes that “we’re simply in the dark about whether (and how likely it is that) there are 
any God-justifying reasons for permitting a period of divine hiddenness” (2009, pp. 382-383). 
Now we’ve already seen how an atheist might successfully resist such a move – at least for 
herself. But the skeptical theist, naturally enough, accepts it. So we can respond: How long a 
period of divine hiddenness might God tolerate? Might the notion of divine hiddenness 
appropriately be broadened so as to include theists, in the sense that their experiences apparently 
of God, because of unknown Divine purposes requiring it and/or their own spiritual immaturity, 
are not of God at all? Suppose they are not of God in the relevant sense. If persistently and 
clearly presented with such a truth, any theist relying on religious experience would have an 
undefeatable undercutting defeater for such experience as justification for her theistic belief. As 
it is, she is in the dark about whether the relevant proposition is true. So she is in the dark as well 
about whether, more adequately positioned, she would have such a defeater. But surely to 
justifiedly believe that God exists in response to religious experience, she must believe that the 
facts of the case would not support such a defeater. If she cannot so believe, then this itself 
defeats her justification. It follows that she cannot justifiedly believe that God exists in this way.  
Of course there is nothing to require that we restrict ourselves to unknown truths about 
value or modality in this connection. If there may be unknown truths about such things, it is hard 
to see why there might not be unknown truths in certain other, relevantly similar domains as 
well: should we expect our cognitive limitations to be so narrowly circumscribed as to prohibit 
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this? Here it may be apropos to mention that, according to the best science, which theistic 
philosophers will wish to accommodate, we presently exist at a very early stage in the total 
period that may see intelligent life on our planet. We have at most 50,000 years of anything 
approaching careful thought about religion under our belts, and another billion years remain in 
which we – or species that come after us – may continue to think about such things (see 
Schellenberg 2013). Hence there may be many subjects on which we not only could but will do 
better than we have.  
Perhaps – so the skeptical theist should reflect to herself – developments in psychology or 
neurophysiology, emerging long after we are gone, will reveal facts about the current human 
mind and/or brain inconsistent with such religious experiences as traditional theists today 
describe being veridical (undercutting defeater). Another possibility within a skeptically theistic 
frame of reference is that new and even more powerful and convincing theistic religious 
experiences, which advanced techniques of the future show to be veridical but inconsistent with 
God having been present to anyone in our own day in the way that God was thought to be 
present, will arise in the deep future (another undercutting defeater). Perhaps veridical 
experiences of God of sufficient clarity and intensity to justify belief in God are reserved for our 
more fully developed descendants. I would judge that any theist who believes such propositions 
as S1-S3 after fully making the transition from human to scientific timescales and properly 
appreciating the epistemic weight of distantly future Earthly possibilities will believe as well, 
insofar as reason has its way with her, that we have no good reason for thinking that events of the 
sort I have just described will never occur. S1-S3 describe what is the case for theists only if S4 
does too.  
How might the skeptical theist respond? Well, I suppose she might claim that her 
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experience apparently of God is so intense and clear and enduring as to make it impossible for 
her not to respond to it believingly in the way that she does. One is inclined to think of excuse 
rather than justification in such a case. But we need not sort this out. For the religious 
experiences of theists in the actual world are almost never of that type. Plantinga admits as much 
in his (2000). Even where forceful, they are commonly not enduring. Nor are they frequently so 
discriminating as to have, precisely and clearly, theistic content alone, yielding to no other 
interpretation. Thus there is the opportunity to consider and be influenced by the defeater we 
have constructed from skeptical theistic materials. To the extent that such a defeater is resisted, 
we must wonder how seriously we should take the skeptical theist’s criticisms of Rowe and 
others.  
Perhaps the skeptical theist will at this point seek to defeat my argument by reductio. S4 
appeals explicitly to the epistemic possibility of unknown evidence incompatible with the 
epistemic force of evidence (broadly construed) that theists might seek to use today. The 
skeptical theist may claim that a crucial shift is made when we transition from something like 
‘unknown goods’ to something like ‘unknown evidence.’ The former is precise and localized, 
whereas the latter threatens to balloon out into a skepticism consuming all our beliefs. For which 
beliefs will not be impugned if we always have to worry about completely unknown 
counterarguments and experiences? Since the argument employing S4 implies the acceptability 
of such an unacceptable general skepticism, we have good reason to reject that argument. 
I would suggest that there is indeed a broader skepticism to be developed here (it is the 
elephant in the room), and instead of fleeing from it, we should embrace it. I call it total evidence 
skepticism. To get a basic idea of this skepticism’s distinguishing features, notice first that the 
total evidence relevant to a proposition, as here understood, is not my total relevant evidence or 
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the total relevant evidence available or the total relevant evidence thus far assessed by human 
beings, or anything of the sort, but rather the total relevant evidence simpliciter: everything in the 
world that bears on the truth of that proposition (with the ‘bears on’ relation defined in such a 
way that a proposition cannot evidentially bear on itself) – in other words, the evidence relevant 
to its truth as it would be seen from a God’s-eye view, from the perspective of omniscience.  
With that as background, we may say that total evidence skepticism is the claim that, for 
many a proposition expressing a belief or potential belief of ours, we have reason to be in doubt, 
or skeptical, about whether the total relevant evidence supports that proposition. Even if our 
relevant evidence – the relevant evidence we have actually examined – supports the proposition, 
our evidence may not be representative of the total relevant evidence: for all we know, although 
the former supports it, the latter does not. Now a proposition is true only if the total evidence in 
my sense does support it. Thus where we have reason to be in doubt about whether the total 
evidence supports some proposition, we also have reason to be in doubt as to whether that 
proposition is true.  
I have had something to say about this sort of skepticism elsewhere (Schellenberg 2007, 
2013). And much more needs to be said. In particular, the related points about the deep future 
and our place in time touched on earlier in this paper need to be unravelled further. Here it will 
suffice to point out that if through investigation the skeptical theist comes to feel the force of 
something like total evidence skepticism, she will also see that the apparently troublesome 
feature of S4, treated here as paving the way for a reductio, ought rather to be embraced. 
But we need to preempt a certain sort of response to this reasoning, a somewhat unsubtle 
response lurking already in the way I earlier phrased the objection here addressed. This response 
repeats the concern that it’s ‘all or nothing’ – total evidence skepticism is also total skepticism, 
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and should be expected to consume all our beliefs. Here I would urge calm. There is no reason to 
expect at the outset of such a discussion that no way of discriminating among propositions in 
respect of belief-worthiness, no criteria for sensible discrimination, can ever be found. Especially 
is this the case since total evidence skepticism, if linked to a proper appreciation of our place in 
scientific time, has to be seen as arising within inquiry. It is part of an attempt to further 
discovery of truths about the world by means compatible with our present primitivity. The 
inquiry to which it sees itself as attached springs not from belief of some controversial 
proposition to which it might itself be applied but from a love of understanding by which many 
of us are gripped, even in our primitivity. And although such love presupposes certain beliefs, 
such as the belief that understanding is of great value and worth pursuing, such beliefs are ones 
that serious inquirers will regard as evidently true.  
Thus although total evidence skepticism is opposed to the blithe confidence about 
complex matters we may have felt in the absence of respect for the future, and so can be 
experienced as initially jarring or disillusioning, the vulnerability of the propositions it places in 
question is quite compatible with the intellectual safety of many others. We may have learned, 
through investigation in science, that we are still at the very beginning of organized inquiry on 
this planet, and that quite possibly there are many more – and also radically different and better 
justified – ideas to come, and this particularly in our most ambitious inquiries, focused on the 
more profound and complex matters. But we also see that a balance must be struck. The 
parameters of inquiry themselves require that we reject the idea that in our short time on the 
scene we have learned nothing of importance. How to strike the balance therefore should become 
an object of inquiry in its own right, replacing any alarm over the possibility of a descent into 
global skepticism (see Schellenberg 2013).
vi
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Having said that, it does seem that the claim that theistic belief is justified by experiences 
apparently of God is going to be among the more vulnerable here. It certainly faces total evidence 
skepticism much more clearly than do the claims of the atheistic arguments I defended against 
skeptical theism in section I. Although there are plenty of questions about how and when such 
skepticism ought to be deemed applicable, it will be hard to deny that what seems most obvious 
to us upon reflection should be given a pass. And there don’t seem to be any obvious-seeming 
truths in the neighborhood that the theist could turn to her advantage in the way that I have 
suggested the atheist may turn to her advantage certain apparent necessary truths about horrors 
and hiddenness.  
If this assessment is correct, then although I have not insisted that any atheistic argument 
should convince the theist, we can use the very sort of skeptical reasoning against which we 
defended the atheist’s right to believe his argument sound to argue that what does convince many 
a theist – experiences apparently of God – ought not to do so. Even should Rowe’s argument or 
some other probabilistic argument from horrors or hiddenness fall to skeptical theism, such an 
event can be made the occasion of learning all-round when the atheist, in return, hands something 
like S4 to the theist and thus removes what may be essential grounds for her belief in God. 
Skeptical theism invites skeptical atheism.  
 
III.    
As just suggested, the atheism I defend arises in the context of total evidence skepticism and so 
(given my particular way of developing that skepticism) with an awareness of human immaturity 
in scientific time. And so we have another way of understanding that term ‘skeptical atheism.’ 
The seeming paradoxicality of this idea is erased when we notice that total evidence skepticism 
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may be accepted for the purposes of deeper inquiry and so along with the aim to make what 
progress we can, even at our relatively primitive stage of development, by reference to (among 
other things) what seems to us most obviously true. The atheist will think her own position may 
represent such progress. But skepticism still marks the larger context in which she operates, if 
she behaves as I think she ought. Thus, for example, my sort of atheist will note how much more 
ambitious metaphysical naturalism is than atheism, and how many interesting options are ruled 
out if one is a naturalist. And so she will not immediately endorse naturalism along with her 
atheism. Hers is an investigative atheism, not the sort of reactionary atheism that is unfortunately 
all too common in our culture today, which is as firmly wed to naturalism as many theists are to 
theism, reacting to the latter from a prior commitment to the former.
vii
  
Against this background I will be understood when I say that an investigative atheism 
may take some interest in showing how the skeptical theistic way of reasoning, brought into the 
larger flow of total evidence skepticism, can be used to expose certain additional sources of 
doubt about theism sufficient to prevent overhasty migration to theism on the part of those left 
unconvinced by atheism. Moreover, and more positively, it can be used to inspire a greater 
openness to new religiously-relevant investigative results in the future. With these thoughts in 
mind, let’s add two more skeptical theses to our list: 
 
S5 We have no good reason for thinking that the arguments from horrors or 
hiddenness against theism we know of are representative, relative to the property 
of (potentially) constituting a successful proof that theism is false, of the 
arguments from horrors or hiddenness against theism there are. 
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S6  We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are 
representative, relative to the property of consistency with a person being 
axiologically ultimate, of the possible goods there are.  
 
Unlike S4, these two theses are not theism-friendly: good reason to believe theism true is 
good reason to believe that the arguments from horrors and possible goods we know of are 
representative (in the relevant senses) of the arguments from horrors and possible goods there 
are. So the theist will say that we have to show that he lacks good reason to believe theism true 
before we can expect him to go along with S5 and S6. Now if the ‘good reason to believe theism 
true’ that the theist takes himself to have depends on religious experience in any way, then 
perhaps we have already done so. But my main purpose here is to show what atheists can do for 
investigation in philosophy by defending atheism in a context where certain skeptical theses are 
also defended, and for that purpose no judgment on this matter is needed. So while here noting 
this consequence of our work in the previous section, I shall from here on disregard it.  
Suppose, then, that we are engaging someone who is left unconvinced by atheistic 
reasoning and wondering what to make of theism – someone, moreover, who accepts S1-S3. I 
suggest that, when presented with S5 and S6, she will realize that there is no non-arbitrary way of 
discriminating between the matters addressed by these propositions and those addressed by S1-
S3 in relation to what we have reason to believe. If we are cognitively limited in a way that 
would make the first three propositions true, then the fifth and sixth are true as well: the 
cognitive limitations in question affect all the matters under considerations here if they affect 
any. But what S5 and S6 represent are some new sources of at least doubt about theism. What 
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this means is that with a skeptical theistic sort of reasoning, our questing non-theist has just been 
provided with good reason to remain a non-theist. 
 
S5  
Consider how this works in the case of S5. We easily assume that all of the relevant 
arguments in this or that domain have already been made, and that new authors, striving for 
innovation, just end up recycling old moves. This is a rather cynical view – one that is, I think, 
belied by the facts. However that may be, it seems clear that any non-theist impressed by 
skeptical theism, given even the apparently modest skepticism of S1-S3, is in no position to 
endorse it in relation to hiddenness or horrors. If S1-S3 are correct, then the cynical view is false 
for those domains, for then there may well be unknown facts about value or modality enabling 
deductive arguments from horrors or hiddenness to be made that would strike us as very novel – 
and also as sound, even if all previous efforts have left us unimpressed. How could this be 
denied, if indeed we are in dark about the subjects in question? Perhaps what we are in the dark 
about is just what would enable such arguments to be made. If significant goods and evils and 
logical connections might be unknown to us, then we cannot legislate which way their 
implications would point. Then it might be that, were we to have a God’s-eye view of such 
things, what we would see is that there is no good providing a morally sufficient reason for 
horrors, or that hiddenness entails the absence of some good (or the existence of some other evil) 
that would certainly be present (or absent) were there a perfectly good and loving God. Imagining 
what a God might see is indeed helpful here, as skeptical theism suggests, though what a God 
might see – it would have to be from some other possible world! – is that there is no God.  
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Someone lacking independent reason to believe in God may of course think that such 
arguments as I defended in section I themselves illustrate how new investigations can reveal 
novel and sound arguments from horrors or hiddenness. But my main point here is that even if 
she does not think this, or even if she ceases to think this, the skeptical theistic form of reasoning 
can, ironically, be used to show that she should remain a non-theist.   
 
S6 
Let’s consider next the link between skepticism about value of the sort promoted by S1 
and the skepticism of S6. Since the latter skepticism may seem a bit unusual, and since it is tied 
up with what might be called the positive message of skeptical atheism, which can easily go 
unheeded, I propose to consider it somewhat more fully.  
If there might be a good quite unknown to us that, were we to become aware of it and see 
things clearly, would strike us as providing a good reason for God to permit horrors, then our 
picture of value must be very partial indeed. Our understanding of value-related facts might have 
to be completely reconfigured to accommodate such a good – if an unsurpassably good and 
loving person would have a good reason to permit millions of horrors over a period of many 
millennia then the realm of value must be very strange. But then there is no non-arbitrary way for 
our non-theist to deny that she lacks good reason for thinking that a Divine reality would be a 
person in the first place. For if the realm of value might be that strange, then our understanding 
of value ultimacy might be mistaken. Then the greatest possible value – which is what I am 
taking axiological ultimacy to entail – might seem very strange to us too. 
There is another way of getting at this point. We have no good reason for thinking we can 
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identify what has the greatest possible value if the most fundamental truths about value might be 
out of reach for us. The most fundamental truths in any domain obviously have a bearing on all 
the others, and might here be expected to determine how ‘greatest’ or ‘least’ in matters of value 
come to apply. And it seems that the most fundamental truths about value may be obscured, and 
indeed the most deeply obscured of value truths, if skeptical theism is on the right track about 
value. Now perhaps we could know the deepest truths about value even if many other significant 
value truths were entirely beyond our ken, but the skeptical theist will surely have a hard time 
convincing us that we do: if some significant value truths might be beyond our ken because of 
relevant cognitive limitations, then the deepest might be beyond our ken too. Consider only how 
so many investigative enterprises have floundered for want of the most fundamental truths in 
their domain – or because of regularly changing views on what these are. Even the delivery of 
more fundamental truths would please many inquirers! Take, for example, physics. Physicists 
would be very happy if they found truths that unify quantum mechanics and general relativity, 
and they might consider themselves to have done so even while remaining doubtful as to whether 
they had struck absolute bedrock explanatorily. The claim to know the most fundamental truths 
in some domain is generally the most ambitious claim one can make. Thus if anything should 
come under the glare of value skepticism on account of our cognitive limitations, surely it is the 
suggestion that one has accessed the most fundamental truths about value. But then without the 
immunity to skepticism about such matters that a theist may take herself to have, our non-theist is 
stuck with the consequent of the conditional mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, which 
says that we are in the dark about what would instantiate the greatest possible value.    
Now if we are thus in the dark, then even if the possible goods we know of are consistent 
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with some characterization of axiological ultimacy, we have no good reason for thinking 
similarly about the possible goods there are. (Notice how modality comes into play here along 
with value.) It follows that even if the possible goods we know of are consistent with a person 
being axiologically ultimate, as perhaps most theists and non-theists today would affirm, we have 
no good reason for thinking that the same is true of the possible goods there are. Despite what the 
goods we know of seem to indicate, there may, if we are in the dark about the greatest possible 
value, be unknown goods belonging to axiological ultimacy that no person could instantiate. 
And, of course, this is just as S6 would have it.
viii
 
Now perhaps the skeptical theist will wish to relieve the non-theist of such doubts. What 
options does she have? Well, perhaps it will seem that even if theism can’t properly be used by 
the non-theist to ground a deductive inference to the conclusion that S6 is false in her own case, 
some other proposition can be thus employed – and can be thus employed while still leaving S1-
S3 in the clear. It may, in particular, seem to the skeptical theist that it is just evident that no non-
person could be axiologically ultimate. One skeptical theist, Peter van Inwagen, actually claims 
as much in his recent Gifford Lectures. As he puts it: “I myself would say, without the least 
immodesty, that I am greater than any possible non-person – simply because I am a person” 
(2006, p. 158). Just what van Inwagen is claiming here is a bit unclear since he doesn’t wish to 
give an analysis of the concept of a person. Intending only to “fix the concept,” he says this: “By 
a person, I mean a being who may be, in the most straightforward and literal sense, addressed – a 
being whom one may call ‘thou’” (2006, p. 20). But it seems clear that he and other skeptical 
theists who hold that no non-person could be axiologically ultimate would be willing to fill out 
this explication in terms of the presence of beliefs, desires, values, rational capacities, and so 
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forth, if only because these are things van Inwagen will surely mention if asked to explain what 
makes him a person and thereby makes him greater than any non-person, and because these are 
properties presupposed by the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and so 
on as understood by traditional theists, who invariably ascribe them to God. So let us assume that 
this somewhat enlarged depiction of a person is applicable here. I will also assume that personal 
qualities are defining qualities, in the case of God, in such a way that no other properties God 
may possess are more fundamental – no other properties subsume the personal ones either 
explanatorily or evaluatively. This seems required by the notion that God is a person, which 
implies that the most fundamental features of Godhood are personal ones.  
On these assumptions, what is to be said for the claim that it is evident that no non-person 
could be axiologically ultimate? van Inwagen himself admits that what we have here is a 
“substantive metaphysical thesis” (2006, p. 158). As such, it is hard to see how a skeptical theist 
could be justified in regarding the notion as evidently true. It is, of course, a notion very familiar 
to us, presupposed in much western religious thought. But anyone who recognizes such facts 
about our place in time as I mentioned earlier, and who thinks, within this frame of reference, 
about how we in the west are only now starting to acquaint ourselves with non-theistic religious 
thought, will regard the observation about familiarity as damaging to the case a skeptical theist is 
here required to make rather than helpful. Add to this what we are just now beginning to learn 
from the fledgling field of study known as the cognitive science of religion about how evolution 
may have predisposed us to find agency especially significant in matters religious (Barrett 2004, 
Boyer 2001, Tremlin 2006), and we will conclude that it would be wise to back away from the 
claim that it is just evident that only a person could be axiologically ultimate. Here it is also 
 
 
23
important to remember that the idea that a non-person could be axiologically ultimate need not 
deny that personal qualities (or properties analogous thereto) would necessarily have some place 
in an ultimate Divine reality. Perhaps they are allotted a lesser role in some larger mix defined by 
valuable properties of which we have, as yet, no inkling (Schellenberg 2009, 2013). Against this 
background, the idea that an axiologically ultimate reality evidently could only be a person must 
seem quite evidently unavailable to a skeptical theist seeking to remove, for non-theists, the new 
source of doubt about theism represented by S6.  
For some this new source of doubt may be disquieting. But within the context of a total 
evidence skepticism sensitive to our place in time it may easily come to appear exhilarating 
instead. Of course if what seems most important to us is that we figure everything out, as swiftly 
as possible, or if a central aim of ours is to protect an understanding (perhaps theistic, perhaps 
naturalistic) that we’ve already arrived at, then such doubt may not seem very attractive. But if 
we allow our imaginations to linger in the thought of an understanding of the world beheld by 
finite beings but so magnificently deep that all our present thinking, even if it contains much 
truth, is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg, we may be attracted to a different stance. In any 
case, it seems clear that skeptical reasoning of the sort employed by the skeptical theist can be 
used to show that, whatever the religious diversity displayed by the world as we know it, much 
deeply significant religious diversity may not yet have come to light. Because of our early place 
in time, we need to be open to the possibility that our best religious ideas – including our best 
ideas about what is axiologically ultimate – are still ahead of us. This is the positive message of a 
skeptical atheism, a message designed to stir us from our complacency and prompt us to begin a 
deeper investigation into things Divine.  
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IV. 
So what options are open or live for skeptical theists who accept my arguments – if any such 
there should be? Well, if the arguments of section II are accepted, then of course a wider 
religious skepticism might be expected to replace the skeptical theist’s theism. But I imagine this 
outcome will, at least for the time being, be resisted by theistic philosophers. I expect there will 
be opposition to the skeptical atheist’s attempt to show that the skeptical theist is ‘hoist by his 
own petard.’ What success might attend such efforts only time will tell. The skeptical theist 
might also rightly point out how an examination of the consequences of theism for a wide array 
of philosophical and religious problems, presently being undertaken by, for example, Christian 
philosophers in America, can make for an investigative theism. This is certainly true, and I can 
imagine a scenario in which skeptical theists and skeptical atheists, both investigatively minded, 
together enlarge our field of vision on many matters that are or ought to be under inquiry. But if 
the fuller doubts that I have argued should come with skeptical theism eventually take hold, then 
a much stronger emphasis on non-theistic pictures of the Divine (or on non-theistic fillings for 
ultimism) might be expected to appear in western philosophy of religion. After all, we have 
devoted centuries and millennia of intense effort to the exploration of theism. One wonders what 
might come of a few millennia of equally rigorous attention to non-theistic ideas, both known 
and (presently) unknown.  
There is also a very different alternative for skeptical theists that at least deserves 
mention. Seeing that whatever supports such theses as S1-S3 supports, in the right circumstances, 
S4-S6 as well, the skeptical theist might regard this as providing what amounts to a reductio for 
the former theses and so come to reject them. Of course, this would mean rejecting skeptical 
theism, too, but it is certainly one of the responses a theist might make.   
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Someone who responds in this way will perhaps be inclined to say: “You’re right – if I 
accept the first three theses on the grounds that make them attractive, then I should find myself 
drawn to the other three as well. But on reflection it seems to me that the other three are false – 
and this even while leaving the possibility of an inference to their falsehood from a prior 
conviction that theism is true entirely to one side! I can use what I presently know about value to 
rule out a non-personal Ultimate, and I can infer from careful research into available arguments 
from horrors and purported defeaters of religious experience as justification for theistic belief 
that no such arguments are successful. Thank you for helping me to see this clearly. Of course, 
now I have to write William Rowe a letter of apology – and maybe also send one to all those 
journals that have published my papers on skeptical theism....”  
I suspect that few skeptical theists will experience such a sudden conversion. But what we 
see here is still a way of responding to the arguments of this paper. I do not believe that it is the 
best response, but if on reflection it seems the right move to make, then our skeptical theist can 
avoid the feasible response I myself would promote, which means giving up theistic belief. Of 
course, to make it, our skeptical theist must cease to be a ‘skeptical’ theist. And I would suggest 
that if she wants to avoid giving up ‘theist’ too, she had better start writing papers on theodicy – 
fast.
ix
   
 
Notes 
                                                 
i.Skeptical theism began with a focus on the problem of evil. But its defenders have recently 
sought to extend it to the hiddenness argument – see Bergmann (2009).  
ii.This statement of Bergmann’s three theses is in some places fuller than his, but the additional 
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material comes right out of his explanation of how the term ‘representative’ is to be taken. (See 
Bergmann 2001, 2009.)  
iii.I believe they also provide justification for a conversion from theism to atheism, but I will not 
argue for this claim here.   
 
iv.It seems unlikely that S1-S3 can be accepted by the atheist compatibly with his accepting the 
moves in atheistic reasoning I have described. What the atheist will conclude, if the 
incompatibility obtains, is that what his moves give him reason to believe makes S1-S3 false in 
his case. But, of course, even then he can go along with a more general caution about how much 
one should claim to know in matters of value and modality.   
v.I owe these terms to discussion with Paul Draper.  
 
vi.A tempting thought that needs to be avoided as we seek such a balance is that the further our 
questions are from matters of pressing human concern, the less we should expect to know about 
them. As Martin Rees points out (2012), some of the best understood subjects concern celestial 
objects existing far from ‘where we live,’ and some of the least well understood, such as the best 
diet or how to predict and control the weather, are quite ‘close to home,’ affecting our lives in 
obvious ways. 
vii.It is important to note here the epistemic asymmetry between atheism and naturalism. 
Atheism makes only the negative claim that there is no person-like Divine. This has many fewer 
metaphysical consequences than the positive claim o
 
 
27
                                                                                                                                                             
Think also of the relative number of alternatives to theism and naturalism – the number of 
different ways in which these propositions can be false. Specifically, naturalism has many more 
alternatives than atheism, all of which must be false if it (naturalism) is true. Similar points arise 
in a comparison of atheism and theism. And so it will not be surprising if atheism does much 
better in a context of total evidence skepticism than either of the other propositions. Here it may 
also be useful to notice that if the existence of God requires that there be a person who is all 
powerful, all-knowing, all good and all loving, as well as the creator of the universe, then theistic 
arguments have the task of showing that all those conditions are satisfied. But an atheistic 
argument need only show that one such condition is not satisfied. For such general reasons as 
these, atheists may be expected to have an easier time than theists resisting total evidence 
skepticism. 
viii.It may be thought that there is an important distinction between ‘greatest possible reality’ and 
‘greatest possible being’ that is relevant here. Perhaps the theistic God realizes the latter property 
while not needing to realize the former. Suppose this is so. It poses no problem for the argument, 
which can be phrased, without loss of plausibility, in terms of either property. 
  
ix. My thanks to Paul Draper and Steve Maitzen for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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